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Abstract: Contentious politics have led to regime downfall or 
democratization of many countries. Today, China is faced with 
increasing numbers of contentions politics. However, Contentious 
politics in China does not result in regime change because the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) manages protests by keeping it fragmented 
and small in scale. It achieves this primarily through structural and 
institutional means, but is willing, to resort to violent repression if a 
protest movement becomes too widespread. This paper is divided into 
four parts. First part is a backgrounder, giving stats to show that 
protests are frequent but small in scale. Second, I will argue that 
China’s weak institutions – labour union, media, and internet – 
preclude small-scale protests from becoming large, cohesive 
movements. Third, I will argue that the government in China is 
structured in such a way that grievances are pursued at the local level; 
therefore, regional protests are unlikely to become national 
movements. Finally, even if protest become large and target the 
central government, the CCP is capable of suppressing protests using 
military, and police, as a last resort. 
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Introduction 
 Throughout history, contentious politics have led to regime 
downfall or democratization of many countries. In the early 1900s, 
devastations of WWI caused many protests that targeted the 
government. Eventually, popular demonstrations led to the regime 
collapse, and it created Fascists States – Germany and Italy – and the 
Communist Soviet. In a more recent event, protests led many 
authoritarian regimes to democratize during the Arab Spring of 2011. 
Contentious politics bring political change because 
concerted resistance can force a government to change (Friedman and 
Taylor 2012). However, Chinese government shows this is not always 
the case. Although the number of contentious politics has been 
steadily increasing in China, the government preserves its status quo 
by keeping protests small. Researchers suggest that even though the 
absolute number of protests has been increasing, the proportion of 
cases with 100 or more participants has been declining (Cai 2010). In 
1993, 16.1% out of 8,700 protests had 100 or more participants; 
however, in 2003, 12% out of 58,500 protests had more than 100 
participants (Cai 2010). In addition, only 5% of petitions from 
industrial sectors in 1999 had more than 100 participants and none of 
it had more than 500 people (Cai 2010). 
Unlike the democratic movements that transformed many 
states of Europe and the Middle East, contentious politics in China 
does not force its government to change. The Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) controls institutions to keep protests independent from 
each other, the central government dodges protestor’s rage by 
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blaming the provincial government, and the CCP uses physical force 
to suppress movements if necessary. These points will be elaborated 
on using three subsequent parts. In the first part, I will argue that 
China’s weak institutions – labour union, media, and internet – 
preclude small-scale protests from becoming large, cohesive 
movements. Second, I will argue that the government in China is 
structured in such a way that grievances are pursued at the local level; 
therefore, regional protests are unlikely to become national 
movements. Finally, even if protests become large and target the 
central government, the CCP is capable of suppressing protests using 
military and police as a last resort.  
Weak Institutions that Represent Protestors 
China’s small-scaled protests can be explained by weak 
institutions – labour union, media, and internet – that otherwise might 
turn small, regional movements into national ones. The Chinese 
labour union has not been successfully leading large-scale workers’ 
protests because they are largely controlled by the government. 
China’s sole labour union, All-China Federations of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) represents 280 million workers, but its leadership 
appointment is based on his/her connection with the party rather than 
his/her relationship with labourers. Consequently, unlike other 
countries – the U.S, Canada, and the Western Europe –, who elect its 
union leaders from pool of working class, the ACFTU leaders have 
been appointed from bureaucrats. For example, Wang Zhaoguo who 
served as the ACFTU Chair in 2002, had a career in Taiwan Affairs 
Department for seven years (Friedman 2014). Li Jianguo, who was 
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the Chair between 2013 to 2018, served ten years as a provincial party 
secretary of Shaanxi before coming to the office (“Li Jianguo” n.d.). 
The current leader of the ACFTU, Wang Dongming, was the party 
secretary of Sichuan province between 2012 and 2018. (“Wang 
Dongming” n.d). More importantly, these leaders jointly held the 
ACFTU Chair position while serving as the Vice-Chairman of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC). Due to union leaders’ 
bureaucratic background, lack of experiences with labourers, and 
political interest, the labour union ensures that protests are isolated 
from the society and do not pose a threat to the regime. 
Moreover, the media is unwilling to spread information, 
which restrains protests to become larger in scale. According to 
Esarey (2005:54), the Chinese media is described as the “party’s 
mouthpiece as well as an industry.” The party retained firm control 
over media industries through appointments of top-level managers. 
The Propaganda Department and the CCP Organization Department 
have been appointing top-level managers whose career prospects 
were based on the loyalty to the party. Although managers needed to 
produce media contents that are attractive to consumers, they had to 
censor politically sensitive topics (Esarey 2005). For example, 
Xinhua and many other state media did not cover large protests in 
Wukan village until a couple of months later, when they started to 
praise how the provisional government handled the incident 
effectively (“China’s State-Run Newspapers Praise Government 
Handling of Wukan Protest” 2011). Knowing the media-state 
connections, citizens are reluctant to approach media for criticizing 
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the state. According to a survey conducted by Cai (2008:97), “only 
less than 5% of citizens chose to approach media when they had 
conflicts with state authorities.” Therefore, media is used as a tool by 
the government to control the flow of information and is viewed as 
untrustworthy by the public. This censored media makes protests 
regional, isolated, and small in scale. 
Furthermore, the CCP is capable of controlling the internet 
that could disseminate information widely and precipitate regional 
protests. Therefore, the CCP has been maintaining stringent control 
over the internet, which is sometimes called as the Great Firewall of 
China (Barne and Ye 1997). Li Yonggang, a Chinese scholar, 
compares hydroelectric water-management system to China’s 
internet control that includes censorship, surveillance, and 
manipulation of information (Mackinnon 2011). For example, the 
central government ordered China’s largest websites, Sina.com and 
Baidu, to censor information by deleting, blocking, or banning certain 
topics or keywords (Mackinnon 2011). During the Chinese pro-
democracy protests in 2011, also known as the Jasmin Revolution, the 
central government ordered to block the word “jasmin” and prevented 
further spread of information that could facilitate larger movements 
(Jacobs and Ansfield 2011). Moreover, during the Xinjiang ethnic 
riots in July 2009, the CCP cut off the internet in the entire province 
for six months to prevent protests from becoming widespread 
(Mackinnon 2011). 
State-Local Separation of Responsibility 
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The CCP legitimizes its leadership through state-local 
separation of responsibility. Most protestors target local governments 
instead of the central government because of this split in their duties. 
Due to decentralization of power and cadre evaluation system, local 
governments are primarily responsible for handling disputes. 
Meanwhile, the central government moderates conflicts between 
local officials and protestors with the petition and the court system. 
This directs dissident’s anger toward local governments while the 
central government arbitrates disputes to gain favour over distressed 
citizens. 
Since the early 1990s, China’s institutional decentralization 
started to put much more responsibility on local governments in 
handling daily issues, which directly put them in conflict with local 
citizens. Especially after the fiscal decentralization, local 
governments started to take a primary role in expanding their budget, 
but many ended up having major disputes with citizens. For local 
governments, land expropriation has been the fastest way to generate 
revenue because governments can stimulate the local economy with 
real estate developments. Chinese constitutions make land 
expropriation much easier for local officials because village cadres 
have the deciding vote regarding land use within a village (Cai 2010). 
However, these processes often result in creating direct conflict 
between local governments and its citizens. For example, in Shantou 
city in Guangdong province, large numbers of peasants attacked 
homes of village cadres in more than ten villages because 
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demonstrators were suspicious of cadre’s corruption in land sales (Cai 
2010).  
In addition, demonstrators target local officials because local 
governments are primarily responsible for resolving disputes under 
the cadre evaluation system. The CCP established three performance 
targets for the political promotion: the veto targets, which prioritize 
social stability; hard targets, which focus on economic growth; and 
soft targets, which include long term issues such as health care and 
education (Ong and Gobel 2014). Even an outstanding performance 
that meets hard targets and soft targets can be discredited if local 
officials fail to meet the veto target that is largely concerned with 
protests. Therefore, local cadres prioritize dealing with protestors, 
which include concessions and repression. Their strategies vary 
depending on forcefulness of action (scale of resistance) and cost of 
concession (financially). Yongshun Cai (2010) argues that when there 
is a forceful resistance group that demands a low financial cost, most 
local governments make financial concessions; however, when there 
is a weak resistance group that demands a high financial cost, most 
local governments use the physical force to repress. In cases where a 
weak resistance group that demands for a low concession, usually 
local governments does not respond (Cai 2010). In all of these cases, 
local governments are the primary contacts in resolving disputes. As 
a result, protestors target local governments for the grievances that 
governments created while demanding for the compensation. 
In the midst of disputes between local cadres and citizens, 
central government legitimizes its leadership by opening up 
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alternative channels – the petition and the court system – for citizens 
to appeal their demands. Petitioning the central government has been 
recognized as a constitutional right since the late 1970s in China (Li, 
Liu, and O’Brien 2012). After Hu Jintao announced improvement of 
the petition system to accommodate more citizens, the number of 
petitioners increased dramatically between 2003 to 2007 (Li et al. 
2012). During this period, the petition office handled 10 million cases 
annually (“Complaint Bureau busiest office in Beijing” 2007). The 
effectiveness of the petition system in resolving disputes still remain 
minimal because the central petition office sends most cases back to 
the local level. However, the petition system has been successful in 
legitimizing the central government by appearing to take the initiative 
to resolve citizens’ concerns. Furthermore, the CCP recently made 
improvements in the court system in order to legitimize its leadership. 
The legal system has been more effective in resolving disputes than 
petitioning. According to the China General Social Survey, 27% of 
total disputes were channeled through legal actions in 2005 (Cai 
2010). Many cases, such as mediation and arbitration of labour, have 
been resolved through the court system (Cai 2010). There are still 
limitations to the court system because the court is not independent 
from the CCP and therefore hard to criminally punish party officials. 
However, the court system is increasingly becoming more effective 
in resolving civil litigations (Cai 2010).  
Consequently, data shows that most Chinese citizens favour 
the central government much more than local governments. 
According to the World Values Survey China in 2012, the satisfaction 
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scored for the central government was 76 out of 100, while village 
level governments were at 54 (Tang 2016). Furthermore, in terms of 
level of trust, central government officials scored 83 points while 
village level officials and county officials scored 54 and 60 
respectively (Tang 2016). Both results show that citizens favour the 
central government and its officials far better than local government 
and its associates. Other research that measures the government 
dissatisfaction after imposing unpopular policy provides a similar 
result. When the policy dissatisfaction increases from minimum (0) 
to maximum (1), the dissatisfaction with village level governments 
increases by 51.7%, county/city level governments by 48.5% but it is 
much smaller in the central government by 29.1% (Tang 2016). It 
shows that dissatisfaction with policies affect the credibility of local 
governments much more than the central government. Due to the split 
in the state and local responsibilities, protestors target local 
governments instead of the central government, thereby protecting the 
legitimacy of the state. 
State’s Capacity 
Overall, China’s weak institutions and its localized 
governing structures prevent small, regional protests from becoming 
large national ones. When these mechanisms fail, however, and 
national protest movements arise, the government uses force as a last 
resort. The state is capable of suppressing large scaled demonstrations 
using military and police. In the early years of the CCP, the party used 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to suppress movements that 
could pose a threat to the regime’s stability. After winning the civil 
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war against the Kuomintang, who fled to Taiwan after the defeat, the 
PLA’s primary goal shifted to restoring order in the newly created 
People’s Republic of China. In 1959, massive demonstrations 
occurred in Lhasa, Tibet that demanded Tibetan autonomy, and this 
has posed a significant threat to the CCP. Tibetan Uprising was ethnic 
in nature with the goals of protecting Tibet’s culture and religion 
(Norbu 2001). The movement had a strong leader, Dalai Lama, and 
the protest was large-scaled with more than 300,000 participants 
(Norbu 2001). The CCP ordered over 30,000 PLA troops to enter 
Tibet and suppressed demonstrators by killing 87,000 Tibetans 
(Norbu 2001). Similarly, in 1989, Tiananmen protest in Beijing posed 
a significant threat to the regime’s stability. The protest was large with 
nearly a million Beijing residents (Zhao 2001). It criticized the 
dictatorial regime while demanding for a democracy, and 
demonstrators were from various sectors of the society ranging from 
police officers, lower party officials, youth league, working-class, and 
professionals (Zhao 2001). The protest again was suppressed by the 
PLA after the CCP declared Martial Law. Nearly 300,000 troops 
began severe suppression of demonstrators, which resulted in 
thousands of casualties (Thomas 2006). For the CCP, the PLA saved 
the regime from collapsing during these massive protests. It was 
possible because the first-generation leader, Mao Zedong, and the 
second-generation leader, Deng Xiaoping, had stringent control over 
the military while on their duty as the General Secretary (Kiselycznyk 
and Saunders 2010). 
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 Since the early 1990s, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) 
replaced the role of the PLA in controlling mass demonstrations. The 
Tiananmen incident marked the turning point for the PAP when the 
CCP started to acknowledge the necessity for the strong public 
security force that could focus on social instability. Consequently, 
between 1989 to 1992, the PAP budget expanded by 45% from 1.1 
billion USD to 1.6 billion USD (Sun and Wu 2008). Within ten years 
after the Tiananmen incident, the PAP developed into a nation-wide 
armed force with more than 1.1 million members (Sun and Wu 2008). 
Meanwhile, the CCP maintained strict control over the PAP through 
an institutional structure of the CCP that authorizes the State Council 
and the Central Military Commission to directly oversee PAP’s 
operations (Sun and Wu 2008). When there were large scaled 
demonstrations that local governments could not handle, the central 
government ordered the PAP to effectively suppress such movements. 
For example, when 100,000 protestors were mobilized against the 
Sichuan Dam project in 2004, 10,000 PAP troops were deployed and 
put an end to the movement (Haggart 2004). Similarly, during the 
2011 pro-democracy protests, upsurge of cross-regional 
demonstrations between twelve to thirteen cities were stopped by 
180,000 PAP troops and 560,000 security volunteers (“China arrests 
more activists for urging protests” 2011). 
Conclusion 
Contentious politics, in and of themselves, do not necessarily 
threaten the stability of an authoritarian regime, so long as they are 
kept fragmented and small. Furthermore, even large scaled 
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demonstrations do not naturally mean the collapse of regime, as long 
as the state is capable of controlling the military and public security 
forces to suppress such movements. The CCP has been effectively 
controlling the labour union, media, and internet to prevent the spread 
of protests, and kept them isolated from the general public. Although 
there were few incidents that mass demonstrations became 
widespread, the CCP was capable of using the PLA and the PAP to 
suppress such movements. Despite the significant control over the 
society, most Chinese view the CCP as positive. It is largely because 
of the split in responsibility between the state and local government 
where local officials take primary role in creating and resolving 
disputes. Consequently, most protests target local governments while 
the central government dodge criticisms by presenting itself as a 
neutral arbitrator. Therefore, despite the rising numbers of 
contentious politics, China still remains as one of the most durable 
authoritarian regimes today.  
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